說實在話, 自家總統自家怎麼罵, 都是關起門的家務事, 但是看到連外國人都這麼罵的時候, 還是會很不舒服, 自家的總統再怎麼爛, 還是中華民國的總統, 等於是自家的老大被人指著鼻子罵, 很爽! 還是很不愉快.
回過頭, 連人家外國人都能指著你鼻子罵了, 表示你這個人的醜事已經不是關起門來自家吵架的家務事, 那這種丟臉程度, 按我, 我早就躲回家裡關起門來, 再也不敢見人. 可是馬英九, 馬總統, 還是高坐在總統廟裡, 比廟裡的神像們還威, 還無法憾動......
很顯然地, 中華民國 -- 台灣的政客們都不具備完全的四維......甚至是......四維從缺, 完全地!! 這是中華民國政治圈裡的美德, 自然, 中華民國的總統當然是要將四維從缺這優良美德發揚到最極致!
講白話就是: 不要臉到了極點, 還敢繼續當個 9% 總統, 這種無恥沒有最高級, 只有無限上綱的比較級!
偏題了, 這篇...全文砍回來, 就是要做紀念的, 請不要跟我計較版權啥的......
* 〈全文〉經濟學人評馬英九：困境中的鹿茸
* Interview with Taiwan's president | Straight from Mr Ma's mouth -- 我看不懂, 但是這是專訪, 比中文翻譯可信度高.....對! 我不信任媒體, 尤其是轉太多手的訊息.
* On the antlers of a dilemma | The ambitions of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president, collide with popular suspicion of China -- "評馬英九: 困境中的鹿茸" 原文
〈全文〉經濟學人評馬英九：困境中的鹿茸
2014年 03月 28日 22:25
http://www.nownews.com/n/2014/03/28/1169788
【鉅亨網編譯許家華 綜合外電】
《經濟學人》在「榕園論壇」(Banyan)中以《困境中的鹿茸》評論馬英九及太陽花學運，以下為全文翻譯：
原本清新的臉龐因繁雜的國事烙印上條條皺紋，雖然能用完美的英語，卻為了尊嚴而使用純正華語，耐心卻帶著一臉疲憊地回答各種問題，彷彿先前已經回答過許多次那樣。然而，馬英九總統任期邁入第6年，他的頭髮依舊如中國官員那般油亮，在總統府接受採訪的他，也如北京高層那樣，不願意承認策略上存有任何根本缺陷。
也許馬英九受到孫中山先生的啟發，而孫中山先生在兩岸均受人民尊為民族英雄，馬英九可能為追求其歷史定位，希望同樣在兩岸獲此榮耀。然而，至少目前台灣與中國大陸尚未統一，而曾是國民黨高人氣政治人物的馬英九卻遭反對黨諷為「9%總統」，該數據為去年秋季馬英九的支持率民調結果。
繼民進黨執政8年兩岸關係緊繃之後，改善兩岸關係成為馬團隊的中心主旨。馬英九誇耀迄今已與中國簽了21項協議，並提出一些兩岸經濟快速整合的數據：6年來中國遊客來台人數成長10倍，2013年達285萬人次；兩岸直航班機從完全沒有到每日118班；兩岸貿易，含香港，已提升至一年 1600億美元。
中國重新吸收台灣的策略昭然若揭，隨著台灣經濟與中國大陸更加密不可分後，中國認為，反統一的聲浪也將隨之退去，屆時台灣就會像香港一樣，成為中國的自治區，只是台灣還具備自己的武力罷了。中國可以不靠飛彈和日漸強大的武力，就讓台灣回歸祖國。但就馬英九的看法，兩岸「友好」是防禦中國侵略的第一戰線，因為「若大陸欲以非和平方式單方面改變現狀，就必須付出高昂的代價」。統獨之爭素來是台灣政治議題，但實際上都偏向維持現狀。
兩岸友好的下一步將是政治領袖之間的會面。繼今年2月南京的「王張會」創1949年來兩岸官方首次正式會談之後，馬英九希望今年11月藉APEC高峰會的機會促成「馬習會」。為了安排香港和台灣兩地，APEC的成員不以國家區分，而是以經濟體區分，因此馬習雙方可以「經濟領袖」的身分出席，迴避尷尬的身份問題，因為中國大陸認為台灣僅是一個省份。雖然大陸官方對此仍有異議，但雙方的會面仍不排除可能性。
這樣的背景解釋了為何反服貿運動對馬英九來說，不僅止是地區性的困難而已。學生以非民主的手段占領國會，他們與民進黨提出的許多服貿論點徒有其表，但他們卻觸及到人民不信任馬英九及中國經濟整合這 2 大要穴。台灣人民之間分裂成世代居住在台灣的本土台灣人，以及像馬英九家族那樣因與中共戰爭失敗後，隨中華民國政府1949年遷台的外省人，反對者通常將馬英九比喻成中國大陸的跟班或者無能、與社會脫節者。因先前馬英九將鹿茸誤稱為鹿耳朵裡的毛，此回占領國會的學生便畫出一張耳朵長出鹿茸的馬英九畫像。
馬英九表示，民意支持「馬習會」，然而，民進黨駐美代表吳釗燮卻認為「馬習會」將使台灣付出政治代價，恐挫傷國民黨在2016年總統大選的表現，馬英九此舉只是為了成就個人的歷史定位。
馬英九表示，台美關係變得比以前更好，至少自1979年台美斷交以來而言，甚至往前回溯也沒有現在的關係好。雖然此點令人懷疑，作為美國轉進亞洲的「樞紐」，美國對台灣的承諾卻鮮少被提及。當號稱美國國際關係「現實主義大師」米爾斯海默 (John Mearsheimer) 提出的時候，引起眾多台灣人關注，其論點是「以策略觀點來說，美國最後恐須接受台灣與中國統一」。對一些人來說，棄台是現實狀況，統一只是遲早的問題。一位在台北的學者認為：「不管策略上、外交上、政治上來說，沒有人站我們這邊；我們必須仰賴中國的善意。」
在失敗主義者和民進黨內欲挑戰中國的冒險主義者之間，馬英九一直試著引導出看似明智的中庸之道，但他似乎一路走來始終艱辛，台灣人民也似乎厭煩他了。台灣人民的利己主義和民進黨的內鬨，可能會讓他們在2016總統大選中選擇另一位國民黨總統，但倘若馬英九希望卸任後，兩岸關係穩定，並為自己找到兩岸和全球都認同的和平者歷史定位，他恐怕要失望了。
『新聞來源／鉅亨網 http://news.cnyes.com/ 』
----
Interview with Taiwan's president
Straight from Mr Ma's mouth
Mar 28th 2014, 10:48 by The Economist
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/03/interview-taiwans-president
The Economist interviewed Ma Ying-jeou, the president of Taiwan, on March 21st, 2014. The interview was used in the reporting of this week's lead note, as well as a Banyan column, and a portion was produced as a video, available here. The following is the unabridged transcript of our correspondent's full interview, with translation from the Mandarin provided by the president's office.
Q1. The Cross-strait Trade in Services Agreement has become a contentious issue in Taiwan. In the past few days, for example, students have occupied the Legislative Yuan. Why do you think there is controversy over the agreement?
President Ma: In Taiwan, any matter that involves cross-strait relations will cause some degree of contention. Domestically, we have not yet reached a significant consensus on how we want to develop our relations with mainland China.
The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) is part of the Cross-Straits Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that we signed with the mainland four years ago. We had explained then that the ECFA is a big framework that would cover trade in services and goods, settlement of disputes, and economic co-operation.
The current situation is caused mainly by a misunderstanding among the public that the TiSA was not put forth for public review. As a matter of fact, over the past year or so, the government has held 110 rounds of talks with 46 different sectors. But because most were small-scale, the public might not have known about them. At the same time, [relevant government agencies] have briefed the Legislative Yuan three times, but critics argue that the agreement would pose a major threat to Taiwan. For example, it would take away job opportunities. But the TiSA will not open Taiwan’s job market to mainland Chinese workers. Explicit restrictions are in place in Article 3 of the agreement. Then some people say that it would jeopardise Taiwan’s national security. In reality, Article 11 of the TiSA prescribes measures for exceptions, that is, restrictions could be imposed if it involved national security. Then there are others who say that the agreement showed disparity with Taiwan opening more sub-sectors to the mainland than vice versa. This is not true either. Taiwan will be allowed access to 80 sub-sectors in mainland China. Many other sub-sectors have not been included in the TiSA because these had already been liberalised in 2001 [when the mainland joined the World Trade Organisation].
After the past several months of clarification, the true picture has become very clear. The current situation has developed because of a dispute that has arisen in the Legislative Yuan during deliberations over the TiSA. Ongoing disputes between the two major political parties have led to this situation. The best solution is to return to the original consensus. I believe there is a chance that the issue could then be resolved.
Q2. What efforts will the government make to address the concerns of the people?
President Ma: Last October, negotiations held between the ruling and opposition parties concluded that the TiSA would be subject to an item-by-item review and vote. The government too agreed with this approach. However, public hearings on the TiSA took more than four months, causing a lengthy delay. The different parties were concerned that this might cause misgivings in the international community and wanted to speed up the process.
Since the debate began on March 10th, there have been many disagreements. When Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) members were presiding over the meeting, they did not allow Kuomintang (KMT) members to express their views. When KMT members were presiding, DPP members occupied the podium. So eventually, KMT legislators decided that they would follow the regulations and deem the review to have been completed. I believe that such disputes concerning legislative review should be resolved through the Legislature’s internal negotiation mechanism. This would allow the review to proceed as originally planned.
Q3. Are there differing opinions of the TiSA within the Kuomintang?
President Ma: The KMT holds a unanimous view internally but differs greatly from the opposition.
Q4. Some people say that Wang Jin-pyng has made no effort to push for the passage of the TiSA. Do you agree?
President Ma: The KMT legislative caucus fully supports the TiSA. We can tell from the meeting convened on March 18th. Because Wang is President of the Legislative Yuan, he has to maintain a transcendent stance on all issues. Of course he wants the TiSA to be passed. He has in the past openly expressed support for the agreement. However, the procedure requires negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties. I think the best way forward is through internal legislative negotiation. Similar disagreements have occurred in the past and have eventually been resolved.
When we signed the ECFA four years ago, the Legislature was the scene of fisticuffs. Some people were injured and sent for emergency treatment. Therefore, I hope that people can remain calm and find a solution to the issue. I believe that this can be resolved.
Q5. If the TiSA is not ratified soon, how will it impact Taiwan’s trade relations with other countries and with mainland China?
President Ma: If the TiSA is not ratified or if it has to be renegotiated, it could have serious consequences and be detrimental to Taiwan’s interests. External trade accounts for 70% of Taiwan’s economic growth. Taiwan has long performed well in external trade, but in the past 10 years or so, countries around the world have signed free-trade agreements (FTA). Many countries want to do business with Taiwan, but when it comes to signing a FTA with us, they become hesitant, because of our diplomatic predicament.
We managed to sign the ECFA with mainland China four years ago, which made it possible for us to sign an investment arrangement with Japan and economic co-operation agreements (ECA) with New Zealand and Singapore. Our international space has begun to expand. We also want to pursue similar deals with the United States and the European Union, and join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). However, if the TiSA is not passed, it would affect our signing of a trade in goods agreement with mainland China. As well, the international community would find it odd that Taiwan, while voicing an interest in joining in regional economic integration, is stalling domestically because of procedural issues. Our sincerity and determination would be questioned. Especially, if after signing the deal with the mainland, we then reverse course, we would no longer be creditable. We might be regarded as an unreliable trade partner. This would be most unfavourable as regards our international participation.
Q6. Do you plan to meet with mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping?
President Ma: I have always maintained an open mind. Last year, we suggested that we could arrange a meeting at the APEC summit so we could avoid the use of official titles and because of venue concerns. The APEC summit is a custom-made forum, as participants represent not countries but economies. They are not addressed as presidents or premiers, but as leaders. The plan was devised long ago, and put in place over 20 years ago to avoid such political concerns. I thought that it would be a good opportunity and the people of Taiwan were very supportive of this idea. However, mainland China does not want the leaders of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to meet at an international event. We do not have an answer at this time. We hope that should an opportunity arise, we could create appropriate conditions and perhaps again consider it. As of now, we do not have another plan.
Q7. There is a rather critical situation going on in the Legislative Yuan which none of us expected when we arrived in Taipei. I wonder how you plan to resolve that. What concerns do you have that this will escalate and lead to a situation where the students might have to be removed by force?
President Ma: We very much regret the situation that arose in the Legislative Yuan three days ago. We think it is a good sign that students express their opinions about national affairs. I appreciate their passion. However, democracy and the rule of law are the basic tenets of a country. It took Taiwan a very long time to establish democracy and the rule of law. I hope everyone will cherish these things. In a democratic society, opinions can be expressed in a peaceful and rational way while upholding the law.
As a matter of fact, the current controversy arose over the TiSA. The ruling and opposition parties had initially reached a consensus on its review. But after as many as 20 public hearings were held, the review process has not gone smoothly at all. The two sides could not reach an understanding. As a result, the procedure could not run its course, which led to the current dispute.
Many members of the public who had come [to the Legislative Yuan] to express their opinions wanted the procedure to be complete. This is the key to resolving the issue. From the conclusions achieved at negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties last October, it is clear that our opposition parties are not against the TiSA, but they want it revised. The ruling party maintains that revising its content would not be in line with international practice. This has prevented the passage of the TiSA. Failure to pass it could be highly detrimental to Taiwan’s long-term economic interests. Therefore, we could not agree with that. The two sides must negotiate further with regard to the review procedure in order to find a solution. We believe that this is a more viable approach.
This issue is a bill before the Legislative Yuan, and should be resolved by the Legislative Yuan. As president, I cannot command the Legislative Yuan. Today, I will convene a meeting with the vice president, the premier, and the President of the Legislative Yuan, to discuss this issue in hopes of finding a solution. In accordance with Article 44 of the ROC Constitution, I have the power to mediate a dispute between the different branches of government. I can play this role only when there is such a need in the Legislative Yuan. In all democratic countries, the parliament operates independently without external intervention.
Q8. Do you rule out the use of force to go in and extract the students from the Legislative Yuan?
President Ma: I respect the actions taken by the Legislative Yuan, because it has independent decision-making powers. In the past, President Wang has not used police powers in the Legislative Yuan. I hope that the protestors will remain calm. And the police will maintain order. As for what you just said with regard to using force to expel the protestors, the police believe that at this point there is no need to resort to such methods.
Q9. What would be the main point of a meeting [with Xi Jinping] in your view? What would you most like to talk to him about?
President Ma: At this moment, we do not yet know whether such a meeting will actually take place. For such a meeting to be held, the country must require it and the people must support it. It must be held in a dignified manner and where both sides enjoy equal status. Only then will such a meeting be in everyone’s interests.
Since our administration came to power six years ago, much progress has been made in cross-strait relations. My core vision has been to create long-term, sustainable peace and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait. In these past six years, we have signed 21 agreements with mainland China, which has contributed greatly to achieving sustainable peace and prosperity. Our mutual interaction has become much broader and closer. The people of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had more opportunities to gain a better understanding of each other through economic, cultural, and other exchanges. We hope to further deepen and broaden these relations.
Looking at actual developments, with so much interaction between the authorities of the two sides, it is not outside the realm of possibility that the respective leaders of the two sides will meet. However, cross-strait relations are very complex. There are many differences in opinion between the two sides, and we therefore have to proceed carefully. I would like to again emphasise that we do not rule out the possibility [of a Ma-Xi meeting], but at this point we have to create many more favourable conditions before such a meeting can take place.
Q10. Might you contemplate a meeting in a third country, along the lines of the Koo-Wang talks in Singapore?
President Ma: I believe what is important at this point is not these peripheral issues. The reasons the two sides should meet and what they should discuss to enhance the welfare of the people on both sides are more important.
Q11. You say that the support of the Taiwan people is very important in this. Do you think they support such a meeting right now?
President Ma: If we look at opinion polls on this issue, we see that from the second half of last year to now, people’s views on this topic have been quite positive.
Q12. Do the current turmoil in the Legislative Yuan and the protests about trade with mainland China not make you worry that public opinion is much more sceptical about this kind of development with China than you suggest?
President Ma: The protests in the Legislative Yuan to some extent can be attributed to distrust and fear of mainland China. However, there are also many other people who do not reject developing relations with mainland China, but who have doubts as to whether the steps taken in this process are sufficient. We have to identify the real problems, and propose solutions for these problems. We should not, because of this, stop engaging mainland China.
At the end of June of 2010, when we were preparing to sign ECFA with mainland China, the DPP organised protests across Taiwan to express disapproval, and there were fistfights in the Legislative Yuan, as a result of which many people were injured. However, since the ECFA has taken effect, it has become clear that the agreement has had a positive impact on our economy. At that time, the effects of the global financial crisis were very pronounced. Based on the past four years of trade with mainland China, we can see that items covered by ECFA have all experienced growth, and these growth rates have been higher than those of items not covered by ECFA. Even when other items were seeing declines, ECFA items continued to see growth. This shows that tariffs play an important role in trade.
Another phenomenon has also been evident, that is, over the past 30-some years, we have had a steady deficit in terms of our agricultural trade with mainland China. At its peak, this deficit reached US$300m. Since last year, however, we have seen the emergence of a trade surplus in this area, of about US$10m. The reason for this is ECFA.
The DPP voiced its strong disagreement with ECFA four years ago. But during the presidential election two years ago, the party’s candidate, Tsai Ying-wen, said that the DPP, if it were to govern again, would accept ECFA and no longer oppose it. We do not know whether they hold the same views and have the same strategies for the TiSA. If the TiSA is not passed, then the trade in goods agreement, which is now being negotiated with mainland China, will not be passed either.
Mainland China is currently our largest trade partner, and if such important agreements are not passed, it is hard to predict how cross-strait relations, as well as our international relations, will be affected. We realise that the impact on Taiwan will be too severe. Therefore, we will explain related issues very clearly, so as to enable the people to gain a better understanding. This is similar to what we did when the ECFA was signed.
In the past 10 years, in terms of our efforts to sign free-trade or economic co-operation agreements, we have lagged far behind our main trade competitors, such as the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Japan, and Hong Kong. We can say that we are in last place in this regard. If, at this point in time, we continue to have these internal conflicts, thereby hurting our international competitiveness, Taiwan’s economy will be affected in a way that is difficult to predict. This is our main concern. And this is why we will spare no effort in clearly explaining the importance of the TiSA to the people.
Q13. We’ve seen various academics questioning America’s commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act. How much are you concerned about the solidity of America’s support for Taiwan?
President Ma: Since the end of formal diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979, bilateral ties have been maintained relying a great deal on the Taiwan Relations Act. On the 10th of next month, the Act will have been law for 35 years. It is because of the Act, and the friendship we have had with the US for a century, that relations are today at their best since the severing of diplomatic ties, or even better than they were prior to that occurrence.
Q14. On the security side of the relationship, how concerned are you about a different development from the one you’ve just described? Numerous agreements on the trade front and other fronts with mainland China, but a continuing buildup of their [mainland China’s] military that the Americans have described as beginning to tip the military balance in their direction. I wonder how much that concerns you.
President Ma: The cross-strait military balance began to tip in the mainland’s favour in 2005, three years before I took office. Three years after I took office, because we re-established trust with high-ranking US officials, co-operation with the US on security issues was much greater than had been the case in the past. We have never had the intention of engaging in an arms race with mainland China. Our national defence strategy is composed of three lines: first, rapprochement with mainland China; second, making contributions to the international community; and third, military power. The core of our strategy is that neither side of the Taiwan Strait should take lightly unilaterally changing the status quo.
Over the past six years, we have seen the number of mainland tourists increase tenfold. It totalled some 2.85m last year. The number of mainland students in Taiwan, meanwhile, has grown nearly thirtyfold, from 823 to 24,787. When I took office, there were no cross-strait flights. Today, there are 118 daily flights. Cross-strait trade, including that with Hong Kong, exceeds US$160 billion annually, while over 8m trips are made between the two sides. So a unilateral move by the mainland to change the status quo by non-peaceful means would come at a dear price. This is why we have made cross-strait rapprochement our first line of defence.
Over the past six years, we have striven to make Taiwan a peace-builder, a provider of international humanitarian aid, and a promoter of cultural exchanges. We also hope to be seen as a creator of new technologies and business opportunities, as well as a standard-bearer of Chinese culture. You can see that, within the past six years, our rescue personnel have been active providing aid to mainland China, Haiti, Japan, and the Philippines when these areas suffered natural disasters. We have also signed the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, ending a conflict that had plagued the two sides for over 40 years. Also last year, our government engaged the Philippines in negotiations over the shooting death of one of our fishermen by members of the Philippine Coast Guard. We received an official apology and compensation, and the perpetrators are to be prosecuted, and we signed an agreement on law enforcement. This thus ended the crisis. Using peaceful means to end international disputes shows the international community that Taiwan is an asset, not a liability. We are, on the one hand, a peace builder, and on the other, a provider of aid to many nations in need.
Whether it’s the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, or the South China Sea, the trend is for greater peace and stability. We are looking for the Republic of China to continue to play this kind of role. In this way, should conflict occur across the Taiwan Strait, the Republic of China could count on international support.
The third line of defence is military power. We hope through foreign arms purchases, and improving our service members’ combat readiness, that we will create a sufficient deterrent. We do not seek war, but neither do we shrink from it. Our defensive strategy is to have a rock-solid defence force that is an effective deterrent.
Q15. In the context of the third line of defence, how problematic is the shift to an all-volunteer army proving? I understand that there are some problems with recruitment.
President Ma: Let me first clarify that we are not moving to an all-volunteer system. Ours will be largely a voluntary force, but not an all-volunteer force. We still have conscription. All males of enlistment age are obliged to spend four months in military training, following which they become part of the reserve. During wartime, they can also be called up to active service.
The Constitution states that the people have the duty to perform military service. Were we to do away with the four-month requirement, we would be in danger of violating the Constitution.
All nations that go by a volunteer system, especially those that had practiced conscription, experience a temporary dip in personnel numbers. With such a systemic change, it is natural that supporting measures will be insufficient. We have just made our change, and are tackling difficulties as they arise.
We have three main goals. First is to enhance the military’s combat readiness. Second is a more reasonable use of human capital. Last is reducing social costs.
As to enhancing combat readiness, let me explain by way of an example. Take a private. Under the old system, he would serve for a year. He completed his service just as he was getting a feel for things. Under the new system, volunteers serve for four years per enlistment. This means that mature soldiers will serve for a longer period. This will naturally increase combat readiness.
We also want to attract young people into the military, which requires improvements in three areas. The first is pay. A private under the old system would have been paid about NT$6,000 per month as basic salary. Under the volunteer system, that same soldier will receive NT$33,000, a better than fivefold increase. Second, is honour. We must, on many fronts, increase soldiers’ social status, that they get the respect they deserve. Third, is career path. During the four-year enlistment period, soldiers will be given all manner of vocational training. Our hope is that they end their time in the military with at least one professional certificate, that when they re-enter society, they will not have trouble finding a job.
Of course, we hope to retain such people, and we have seen a retention rate of nearly 60% following these recent developments. This is no small achievement since the changeover to the new system. And we have been resolving difficulties we have encountered one by one by implementing our strategy.
Second is the reasonable use of human capital. Not all males of enlistment age will now be required to serve, but rather only a small proportion. Others will be able to follow their own career interests. This is, of course, a more reasonable use of human capital.
Third is reducing the cost to society. When all the males of a certain age are serving in the military, this naturally places a cost on society. Many businesses will lack the manpower they need, which will limit our overall development. There is, therefore, a great social cost. Through the changes we have overseen, we will reduce this cost.
Two months ago, the Executive Yuan raised the salary for voluntary military personnel, which has had an amazing result. Some 60 years ago, our military personnel numbered over 600,000. Today, they stand at roughly 200,000, a number that may fall a little further. This size of military is sufficient to defend Taiwan given modern self-defence methods.
Q16. You talked about the peacemaking role of Taiwan. I wonder whether you see Xi Jinping as a peacemaker as well.
President Ma: I take from his remarks that he is. He often says that he seeks regional peace.
Q17. At the same time, we’ve seen a number of developments about which countries in this region have expressed great concern—the Philippines, Vietnam, and others—relating to, really the opposite of the situation you just described, in other words, what they see as attempts to change the status quo. How worried are you about that?
President Ma: Conflict between Japan and mainland China is of course worrisome. This is why, two years ago this August, I put forth the East China Sea Peace Initiative, in the hope that both sides would exercise self-restraint, prevent the escalation of tensions, and use peaceful dialogue to resolve conflict.
The Republic of China is a party to the dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. We were the first to call for peace. As a consequence, we have signed a fisheries agreement with Japan. Even though we have not resolved the sovereignty dispute, we have resolved that concerning fisheries. So we have reduced the scope of the problem.
In other words, sovereignty cannot be divided, but resources can be shared. In Europe, in the UK, the way the dispute over North Sea oil deposits was resolved is worth looking at. Parties concerned did not quarrel over the size of their oceanic territories, but concentrated on co-operating to develop the oil resources. This is why Brent crude is an internationally recognised brand today.
As a party to the dispute, we may not be able to make the dispute between Japan and the mainland disappear immediately, but we can at least prevent it from growing. We can be a leader in using peaceful means to resolve the dispute, or to ameliorate it. We hope all parties will shelve their sovereignty claims and peacefully negotiate a way to jointly develop resources in the area.
Q18. If you look at the four economies that we used to club together as the original Asian Tigers—Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong—they are all having to reinvent themselves. Do you think that those four economies can still learn from each other? Does Taiwan have any other economic models in mind that it wants to emulate?
President Ma: I believe that the Four Asian Tigers can still learn from each other, even though their specific situations may be slightly different. For example, our situation is similar to that of the Republic of Korea, and rather different from those of Singapore and Hong Kong, because the latter are basically cities. Nonetheless, in terms of their strategies for economic development, they can still serve as a valuable reference.
Looking at the economic performance of these four countries and regions over the past six years, our economic growth rate has been 2.91%, second to Singapore. This is based on nominal GDP. If we look at GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, we have had the highest growth rate.
We also have had the lowest CPI among the Four Asian Tigers. Our unemployment rate has been relatively high, but our misery index—calculated by adding the inflation rate to the unemployment rate—was the second-lowest amongst the four.
Our problem is that we have made insufficient progress in terms of liberalisation, and the pace of our industrial restructuring has been too slow. With regard to regional economic integration, we have to make up considerable ground to be able to compete with Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Republic of Korea.
Q19. Domestic politics. It hasn’t looked good for your own popularity and you face a difficult period ahead with elections at the end of this year and 2016. What’s gone wrong?
President Ma: Electricity and gas price issues that emerged two years ago have caused discontent among our citizens. However, we are gradually overcoming these problems. People have also been dissatisfied with other issues, such as the capital-gains tax and US beef imports. But we have resolved these step by step.
We will continue to work hard to improve these situations, and we are confident that we will be able to do so.
----
Banyan
On the antlers of a dilemma
The ambitions of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president, collide with popular suspicion of China
Mar 29th 2014 | From the print edition
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21599812-ambitions-ma-ying-jeou-taiwans-president-collide-popular-suspicion-china
THE fresh-faced good looks have been lined and drawn by the cares of office. His immaculate English is forsaken for the dignity of immaculate Mandarin. Patient replies to questions come wearily, as if said many times before. Yet, six years into his presidency, Ma Ying-jeou’s hair remains as lush and jet-black as any Chinese Politburo member’s. And, speaking in the presidential palace in Taipei, he remains as unwilling as any leader in Beijing to admit to any fundamental flaws in strategy.
Perhaps Mr Ma draws inspiration from his portrait of Sun Yat-sen, founder of his ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and, in 1912, of the Republic of China to which Taiwan’s government still owes its name. Sun is revered as a nationalist hero not just by the KMT but, across the Taiwan Strait, by the Chinese Communist Party too. Mr Ma may also hope to be feted on both sides of the strait—in his case as a leader responsible for a historic rapprochement. For now, however, reconciliation between Taiwan and China remains distant. And Mr Ma, once the KMT’s most popular politician, is taunted by opponents as the “9% president”, a reference to his approval ratings in opinion polls last autumn.
Improving relations with China has been the central theme of his administration, after the tensions of eight years of rule by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which leans towards declaring formal independence from the mainland. Mr Ma can boast of 21 agreements signed with China. He reels off the numbers of two fast-integrating economies: a tenfold increase in six years in mainland tourists to Taiwan, to 2.85m in 2013; cross-strait flights from none at all to 118 every day; two-way trade, including with Hong Kong, up to $160 billion a year.
China’s strategy to reabsorb Taiwan is plain. As the island’s economy becomes more intertwined with that of the vast mainland, China thinks, resistance to unification will wane. Then Taiwan becomes an “autonomous” part of China—like Hong Kong, though allowed its own army. Taiwan will return to the motherland without resort to the missiles and increasingly powerful armed forces ranged against it. But as Mr Ma sees it, cross-strait “rapprochement” is a first line of defence against Chinese aggression, since “a unilateral move by the mainland to change the status quo by non-peaceful means would come at a dear price”. Politics in Taiwan is framed as a debate about independence or unification but is really about preserving the status quo.
The next step in rapprochement with China would be a meeting between political leaders. In February in Nanjing, once the capital of a KMT government of all China, ministers from China and Taiwan held their first formal meeting since 1949. Mr Ma hoped to meet China’s president, Xi Jinping, in Beijing this November, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit. To accommodate Hong Kong and Taiwan, APEC’s members are not “countries” but “economies”. So Mr Xi and Mr Ma could meet as “economic leaders”, sidestepping the tricky protocol that usually dogs relations, with China viewing Taiwan as a mere province. The Chinese demurred. But Mr Ma thinks a meeting somewhere is “not outside the realm of possibility”.
This backdrop explains why a protest movement against a services-trade agreement with the mainland is more than a little local difficulty for Mr Ma. Students occupying parliament have resorted to undemocratic means, and many of the arguments they and the DPP make about the trade agreement are specious. But they have tapped a vein of popular mistrust of Mr Ma and of economic integration with the mainland. A split persists between native Taiwanese, on the island for generations, and mainlanders, like Mr Ma, whose families came over as the KMT lost the civil war in the 1940s. Protesters portray Mr Ma as either a mainland stooge or as clueless and out of touch. In the occupied parliament, student caricatures give him antlers, a reference to a slip he once made when he appeared to suggest that the deer-antlers used in Chinese medicine were in fact hair from the animal’s ears.
Mr Ma says public opinion supports a “Ma-Xi” summit. Joseph Wu of the DPP, however, claims such a meeting would actually damage the KMT in the next presidential election, due in 2016; rather, he says, Mr Ma is trying to leave a personal legacy. The DPP’s lead in the polls alarms not just the Chinese government but also America, which could do without another flare-up in a dangerous region. The stronger China grows, the more Taiwan’s security depends on commitments from America. It switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1979, but Congress then passed a law obliging it to help Taiwan defend itself.
All political lives end…
Mr Ma says relations with America are better than they have ever been at least since 1979 and perhaps before. Others are doubtful. In all the talk of America’s “pivot” to Asia, its promises to Taiwan are rarely mentioned. Many in Taiwan paid attention when John Mearsheimer, an American academic, suggested in the National Interest, a policy journal, that there is “a reasonable chance American policymakers will eventually conclude that it makes good strategic sense to abandon Taiwan and to allow China to coerce it into accepting unification.” For some, abandonment is a fact of life and unification a matter of time. “No one is on our side strategically, diplomatically, politically; we have to count on China’s goodwill,” an academic in Taipei argues.
Mr Ma has tried to steer what seems a sensible middle course between such defeatism and the adventurism of those in the DPP who would like to confront and challenge China. But he sounds weary with the effort, and Taiwan’s people seem weary of him. Their pragmatism and the DPP’s internecine strife may yet see them elect another KMT president in 2016. But if Mr Ma hoped to leave office with cross-strait relations stabilised, and with his own role as an historic peacemaker recognised on both sides and around the world, he seems likely to be disappointed.
Economist.com/blogs/banyan
回過頭, 連人家外國人都能指著你鼻子罵了, 表示你這個人的醜事已經不是關起門來自家吵架的家務事, 那這種丟臉程度, 按我, 我早就躲回家裡關起門來, 再也不敢見人. 可是馬英九, 馬總統, 還是高坐在總統廟裡, 比廟裡的神像們還威, 還無法憾動......
很顯然地, 中華民國 -- 台灣的政客們都不具備完全的四維......甚至是......四維從缺, 完全地!! 這是中華民國政治圈裡的美德, 自然, 中華民國的總統當然是要將四維從缺這優良美德發揚到最極致!
講白話就是: 不要臉到了極點, 還敢繼續當個 9% 總統, 這種無恥沒有最高級, 只有無限上綱的比較級!
偏題了, 這篇...全文砍回來, 就是要做紀念的, 請不要跟我計較版權啥的......
* 〈全文〉經濟學人評馬英九：困境中的鹿茸
* Interview with Taiwan's president | Straight from Mr Ma's mouth -- 我看不懂, 但是這是專訪, 比中文翻譯可信度高.....對! 我不信任媒體, 尤其是轉太多手的訊息.
* On the antlers of a dilemma | The ambitions of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president, collide with popular suspicion of China -- "評馬英九: 困境中的鹿茸" 原文
〈全文〉經濟學人評馬英九：困境中的鹿茸
2014年 03月 28日 22:25
http://www.nownews.com/n/2014/03/28/1169788
【鉅亨網編譯許家華 綜合外電】
《經濟學人》在「榕園論壇」(Banyan)中以《困境中的鹿茸》評論馬英九及太陽花學運，以下為全文翻譯：
原本清新的臉龐因繁雜的國事烙印上條條皺紋，雖然能用完美的英語，卻為了尊嚴而使用純正華語，耐心卻帶著一臉疲憊地回答各種問題，彷彿先前已經回答過許多次那樣。然而，馬英九總統任期邁入第6年，他的頭髮依舊如中國官員那般油亮，在總統府接受採訪的他，也如北京高層那樣，不願意承認策略上存有任何根本缺陷。
也許馬英九受到孫中山先生的啟發，而孫中山先生在兩岸均受人民尊為民族英雄，馬英九可能為追求其歷史定位，希望同樣在兩岸獲此榮耀。然而，至少目前台灣與中國大陸尚未統一，而曾是國民黨高人氣政治人物的馬英九卻遭反對黨諷為「9%總統」，該數據為去年秋季馬英九的支持率民調結果。
繼民進黨執政8年兩岸關係緊繃之後，改善兩岸關係成為馬團隊的中心主旨。馬英九誇耀迄今已與中國簽了21項協議，並提出一些兩岸經濟快速整合的數據：6年來中國遊客來台人數成長10倍，2013年達285萬人次；兩岸直航班機從完全沒有到每日118班；兩岸貿易，含香港，已提升至一年 1600億美元。
中國重新吸收台灣的策略昭然若揭，隨著台灣經濟與中國大陸更加密不可分後，中國認為，反統一的聲浪也將隨之退去，屆時台灣就會像香港一樣，成為中國的自治區，只是台灣還具備自己的武力罷了。中國可以不靠飛彈和日漸強大的武力，就讓台灣回歸祖國。但就馬英九的看法，兩岸「友好」是防禦中國侵略的第一戰線，因為「若大陸欲以非和平方式單方面改變現狀，就必須付出高昂的代價」。統獨之爭素來是台灣政治議題，但實際上都偏向維持現狀。
兩岸友好的下一步將是政治領袖之間的會面。繼今年2月南京的「王張會」創1949年來兩岸官方首次正式會談之後，馬英九希望今年11月藉APEC高峰會的機會促成「馬習會」。為了安排香港和台灣兩地，APEC的成員不以國家區分，而是以經濟體區分，因此馬習雙方可以「經濟領袖」的身分出席，迴避尷尬的身份問題，因為中國大陸認為台灣僅是一個省份。雖然大陸官方對此仍有異議，但雙方的會面仍不排除可能性。
這樣的背景解釋了為何反服貿運動對馬英九來說，不僅止是地區性的困難而已。學生以非民主的手段占領國會，他們與民進黨提出的許多服貿論點徒有其表，但他們卻觸及到人民不信任馬英九及中國經濟整合這 2 大要穴。台灣人民之間分裂成世代居住在台灣的本土台灣人，以及像馬英九家族那樣因與中共戰爭失敗後，隨中華民國政府1949年遷台的外省人，反對者通常將馬英九比喻成中國大陸的跟班或者無能、與社會脫節者。因先前馬英九將鹿茸誤稱為鹿耳朵裡的毛，此回占領國會的學生便畫出一張耳朵長出鹿茸的馬英九畫像。
馬英九表示，民意支持「馬習會」，然而，民進黨駐美代表吳釗燮卻認為「馬習會」將使台灣付出政治代價，恐挫傷國民黨在2016年總統大選的表現，馬英九此舉只是為了成就個人的歷史定位。
馬英九表示，台美關係變得比以前更好，至少自1979年台美斷交以來而言，甚至往前回溯也沒有現在的關係好。雖然此點令人懷疑，作為美國轉進亞洲的「樞紐」，美國對台灣的承諾卻鮮少被提及。當號稱美國國際關係「現實主義大師」米爾斯海默 (John Mearsheimer) 提出的時候，引起眾多台灣人關注，其論點是「以策略觀點來說，美國最後恐須接受台灣與中國統一」。對一些人來說，棄台是現實狀況，統一只是遲早的問題。一位在台北的學者認為：「不管策略上、外交上、政治上來說，沒有人站我們這邊；我們必須仰賴中國的善意。」
在失敗主義者和民進黨內欲挑戰中國的冒險主義者之間，馬英九一直試著引導出看似明智的中庸之道，但他似乎一路走來始終艱辛，台灣人民也似乎厭煩他了。台灣人民的利己主義和民進黨的內鬨，可能會讓他們在2016總統大選中選擇另一位國民黨總統，但倘若馬英九希望卸任後，兩岸關係穩定，並為自己找到兩岸和全球都認同的和平者歷史定位，他恐怕要失望了。
『新聞來源／鉅亨網 http://news.cnyes.com/ 』
----
Interview with Taiwan's president
Straight from Mr Ma's mouth
Mar 28th 2014, 10:48 by The Economist
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/03/interview-taiwans-president
The Economist interviewed Ma Ying-jeou, the president of Taiwan, on March 21st, 2014. The interview was used in the reporting of this week's lead note, as well as a Banyan column, and a portion was produced as a video, available here. The following is the unabridged transcript of our correspondent's full interview, with translation from the Mandarin provided by the president's office.
Q1. The Cross-strait Trade in Services Agreement has become a contentious issue in Taiwan. In the past few days, for example, students have occupied the Legislative Yuan. Why do you think there is controversy over the agreement?
President Ma: In Taiwan, any matter that involves cross-strait relations will cause some degree of contention. Domestically, we have not yet reached a significant consensus on how we want to develop our relations with mainland China.
The Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) is part of the Cross-Straits Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) that we signed with the mainland four years ago. We had explained then that the ECFA is a big framework that would cover trade in services and goods, settlement of disputes, and economic co-operation.
The current situation is caused mainly by a misunderstanding among the public that the TiSA was not put forth for public review. As a matter of fact, over the past year or so, the government has held 110 rounds of talks with 46 different sectors. But because most were small-scale, the public might not have known about them. At the same time, [relevant government agencies] have briefed the Legislative Yuan three times, but critics argue that the agreement would pose a major threat to Taiwan. For example, it would take away job opportunities. But the TiSA will not open Taiwan’s job market to mainland Chinese workers. Explicit restrictions are in place in Article 3 of the agreement. Then some people say that it would jeopardise Taiwan’s national security. In reality, Article 11 of the TiSA prescribes measures for exceptions, that is, restrictions could be imposed if it involved national security. Then there are others who say that the agreement showed disparity with Taiwan opening more sub-sectors to the mainland than vice versa. This is not true either. Taiwan will be allowed access to 80 sub-sectors in mainland China. Many other sub-sectors have not been included in the TiSA because these had already been liberalised in 2001 [when the mainland joined the World Trade Organisation].
After the past several months of clarification, the true picture has become very clear. The current situation has developed because of a dispute that has arisen in the Legislative Yuan during deliberations over the TiSA. Ongoing disputes between the two major political parties have led to this situation. The best solution is to return to the original consensus. I believe there is a chance that the issue could then be resolved.
Q2. What efforts will the government make to address the concerns of the people?
President Ma: Last October, negotiations held between the ruling and opposition parties concluded that the TiSA would be subject to an item-by-item review and vote. The government too agreed with this approach. However, public hearings on the TiSA took more than four months, causing a lengthy delay. The different parties were concerned that this might cause misgivings in the international community and wanted to speed up the process.
Since the debate began on March 10th, there have been many disagreements. When Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) members were presiding over the meeting, they did not allow Kuomintang (KMT) members to express their views. When KMT members were presiding, DPP members occupied the podium. So eventually, KMT legislators decided that they would follow the regulations and deem the review to have been completed. I believe that such disputes concerning legislative review should be resolved through the Legislature’s internal negotiation mechanism. This would allow the review to proceed as originally planned.
Q3. Are there differing opinions of the TiSA within the Kuomintang?
President Ma: The KMT holds a unanimous view internally but differs greatly from the opposition.
Q4. Some people say that Wang Jin-pyng has made no effort to push for the passage of the TiSA. Do you agree?
President Ma: The KMT legislative caucus fully supports the TiSA. We can tell from the meeting convened on March 18th. Because Wang is President of the Legislative Yuan, he has to maintain a transcendent stance on all issues. Of course he wants the TiSA to be passed. He has in the past openly expressed support for the agreement. However, the procedure requires negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties. I think the best way forward is through internal legislative negotiation. Similar disagreements have occurred in the past and have eventually been resolved.
When we signed the ECFA four years ago, the Legislature was the scene of fisticuffs. Some people were injured and sent for emergency treatment. Therefore, I hope that people can remain calm and find a solution to the issue. I believe that this can be resolved.
Q5. If the TiSA is not ratified soon, how will it impact Taiwan’s trade relations with other countries and with mainland China?
President Ma: If the TiSA is not ratified or if it has to be renegotiated, it could have serious consequences and be detrimental to Taiwan’s interests. External trade accounts for 70% of Taiwan’s economic growth. Taiwan has long performed well in external trade, but in the past 10 years or so, countries around the world have signed free-trade agreements (FTA). Many countries want to do business with Taiwan, but when it comes to signing a FTA with us, they become hesitant, because of our diplomatic predicament.
We managed to sign the ECFA with mainland China four years ago, which made it possible for us to sign an investment arrangement with Japan and economic co-operation agreements (ECA) with New Zealand and Singapore. Our international space has begun to expand. We also want to pursue similar deals with the United States and the European Union, and join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). However, if the TiSA is not passed, it would affect our signing of a trade in goods agreement with mainland China. As well, the international community would find it odd that Taiwan, while voicing an interest in joining in regional economic integration, is stalling domestically because of procedural issues. Our sincerity and determination would be questioned. Especially, if after signing the deal with the mainland, we then reverse course, we would no longer be creditable. We might be regarded as an unreliable trade partner. This would be most unfavourable as regards our international participation.
Q6. Do you plan to meet with mainland Chinese leader Xi Jinping?
President Ma: I have always maintained an open mind. Last year, we suggested that we could arrange a meeting at the APEC summit so we could avoid the use of official titles and because of venue concerns. The APEC summit is a custom-made forum, as participants represent not countries but economies. They are not addressed as presidents or premiers, but as leaders. The plan was devised long ago, and put in place over 20 years ago to avoid such political concerns. I thought that it would be a good opportunity and the people of Taiwan were very supportive of this idea. However, mainland China does not want the leaders of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to meet at an international event. We do not have an answer at this time. We hope that should an opportunity arise, we could create appropriate conditions and perhaps again consider it. As of now, we do not have another plan.
Q7. There is a rather critical situation going on in the Legislative Yuan which none of us expected when we arrived in Taipei. I wonder how you plan to resolve that. What concerns do you have that this will escalate and lead to a situation where the students might have to be removed by force?
President Ma: We very much regret the situation that arose in the Legislative Yuan three days ago. We think it is a good sign that students express their opinions about national affairs. I appreciate their passion. However, democracy and the rule of law are the basic tenets of a country. It took Taiwan a very long time to establish democracy and the rule of law. I hope everyone will cherish these things. In a democratic society, opinions can be expressed in a peaceful and rational way while upholding the law.
As a matter of fact, the current controversy arose over the TiSA. The ruling and opposition parties had initially reached a consensus on its review. But after as many as 20 public hearings were held, the review process has not gone smoothly at all. The two sides could not reach an understanding. As a result, the procedure could not run its course, which led to the current dispute.
Many members of the public who had come [to the Legislative Yuan] to express their opinions wanted the procedure to be complete. This is the key to resolving the issue. From the conclusions achieved at negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties last October, it is clear that our opposition parties are not against the TiSA, but they want it revised. The ruling party maintains that revising its content would not be in line with international practice. This has prevented the passage of the TiSA. Failure to pass it could be highly detrimental to Taiwan’s long-term economic interests. Therefore, we could not agree with that. The two sides must negotiate further with regard to the review procedure in order to find a solution. We believe that this is a more viable approach.
This issue is a bill before the Legislative Yuan, and should be resolved by the Legislative Yuan. As president, I cannot command the Legislative Yuan. Today, I will convene a meeting with the vice president, the premier, and the President of the Legislative Yuan, to discuss this issue in hopes of finding a solution. In accordance with Article 44 of the ROC Constitution, I have the power to mediate a dispute between the different branches of government. I can play this role only when there is such a need in the Legislative Yuan. In all democratic countries, the parliament operates independently without external intervention.
Q8. Do you rule out the use of force to go in and extract the students from the Legislative Yuan?
President Ma: I respect the actions taken by the Legislative Yuan, because it has independent decision-making powers. In the past, President Wang has not used police powers in the Legislative Yuan. I hope that the protestors will remain calm. And the police will maintain order. As for what you just said with regard to using force to expel the protestors, the police believe that at this point there is no need to resort to such methods.
Q9. What would be the main point of a meeting [with Xi Jinping] in your view? What would you most like to talk to him about?
President Ma: At this moment, we do not yet know whether such a meeting will actually take place. For such a meeting to be held, the country must require it and the people must support it. It must be held in a dignified manner and where both sides enjoy equal status. Only then will such a meeting be in everyone’s interests.
Since our administration came to power six years ago, much progress has been made in cross-strait relations. My core vision has been to create long-term, sustainable peace and prosperity across the Taiwan Strait. In these past six years, we have signed 21 agreements with mainland China, which has contributed greatly to achieving sustainable peace and prosperity. Our mutual interaction has become much broader and closer. The people of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have had more opportunities to gain a better understanding of each other through economic, cultural, and other exchanges. We hope to further deepen and broaden these relations.
Looking at actual developments, with so much interaction between the authorities of the two sides, it is not outside the realm of possibility that the respective leaders of the two sides will meet. However, cross-strait relations are very complex. There are many differences in opinion between the two sides, and we therefore have to proceed carefully. I would like to again emphasise that we do not rule out the possibility [of a Ma-Xi meeting], but at this point we have to create many more favourable conditions before such a meeting can take place.
Q10. Might you contemplate a meeting in a third country, along the lines of the Koo-Wang talks in Singapore?
President Ma: I believe what is important at this point is not these peripheral issues. The reasons the two sides should meet and what they should discuss to enhance the welfare of the people on both sides are more important.
Q11. You say that the support of the Taiwan people is very important in this. Do you think they support such a meeting right now?
President Ma: If we look at opinion polls on this issue, we see that from the second half of last year to now, people’s views on this topic have been quite positive.
Q12. Do the current turmoil in the Legislative Yuan and the protests about trade with mainland China not make you worry that public opinion is much more sceptical about this kind of development with China than you suggest?
President Ma: The protests in the Legislative Yuan to some extent can be attributed to distrust and fear of mainland China. However, there are also many other people who do not reject developing relations with mainland China, but who have doubts as to whether the steps taken in this process are sufficient. We have to identify the real problems, and propose solutions for these problems. We should not, because of this, stop engaging mainland China.
At the end of June of 2010, when we were preparing to sign ECFA with mainland China, the DPP organised protests across Taiwan to express disapproval, and there were fistfights in the Legislative Yuan, as a result of which many people were injured. However, since the ECFA has taken effect, it has become clear that the agreement has had a positive impact on our economy. At that time, the effects of the global financial crisis were very pronounced. Based on the past four years of trade with mainland China, we can see that items covered by ECFA have all experienced growth, and these growth rates have been higher than those of items not covered by ECFA. Even when other items were seeing declines, ECFA items continued to see growth. This shows that tariffs play an important role in trade.
Another phenomenon has also been evident, that is, over the past 30-some years, we have had a steady deficit in terms of our agricultural trade with mainland China. At its peak, this deficit reached US$300m. Since last year, however, we have seen the emergence of a trade surplus in this area, of about US$10m. The reason for this is ECFA.
The DPP voiced its strong disagreement with ECFA four years ago. But during the presidential election two years ago, the party’s candidate, Tsai Ying-wen, said that the DPP, if it were to govern again, would accept ECFA and no longer oppose it. We do not know whether they hold the same views and have the same strategies for the TiSA. If the TiSA is not passed, then the trade in goods agreement, which is now being negotiated with mainland China, will not be passed either.
Mainland China is currently our largest trade partner, and if such important agreements are not passed, it is hard to predict how cross-strait relations, as well as our international relations, will be affected. We realise that the impact on Taiwan will be too severe. Therefore, we will explain related issues very clearly, so as to enable the people to gain a better understanding. This is similar to what we did when the ECFA was signed.
In the past 10 years, in terms of our efforts to sign free-trade or economic co-operation agreements, we have lagged far behind our main trade competitors, such as the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Japan, and Hong Kong. We can say that we are in last place in this regard. If, at this point in time, we continue to have these internal conflicts, thereby hurting our international competitiveness, Taiwan’s economy will be affected in a way that is difficult to predict. This is our main concern. And this is why we will spare no effort in clearly explaining the importance of the TiSA to the people.
Q13. We’ve seen various academics questioning America’s commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act. How much are you concerned about the solidity of America’s support for Taiwan?
President Ma: Since the end of formal diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979, bilateral ties have been maintained relying a great deal on the Taiwan Relations Act. On the 10th of next month, the Act will have been law for 35 years. It is because of the Act, and the friendship we have had with the US for a century, that relations are today at their best since the severing of diplomatic ties, or even better than they were prior to that occurrence.
Q14. On the security side of the relationship, how concerned are you about a different development from the one you’ve just described? Numerous agreements on the trade front and other fronts with mainland China, but a continuing buildup of their [mainland China’s] military that the Americans have described as beginning to tip the military balance in their direction. I wonder how much that concerns you.
President Ma: The cross-strait military balance began to tip in the mainland’s favour in 2005, three years before I took office. Three years after I took office, because we re-established trust with high-ranking US officials, co-operation with the US on security issues was much greater than had been the case in the past. We have never had the intention of engaging in an arms race with mainland China. Our national defence strategy is composed of three lines: first, rapprochement with mainland China; second, making contributions to the international community; and third, military power. The core of our strategy is that neither side of the Taiwan Strait should take lightly unilaterally changing the status quo.
Over the past six years, we have seen the number of mainland tourists increase tenfold. It totalled some 2.85m last year. The number of mainland students in Taiwan, meanwhile, has grown nearly thirtyfold, from 823 to 24,787. When I took office, there were no cross-strait flights. Today, there are 118 daily flights. Cross-strait trade, including that with Hong Kong, exceeds US$160 billion annually, while over 8m trips are made between the two sides. So a unilateral move by the mainland to change the status quo by non-peaceful means would come at a dear price. This is why we have made cross-strait rapprochement our first line of defence.
Over the past six years, we have striven to make Taiwan a peace-builder, a provider of international humanitarian aid, and a promoter of cultural exchanges. We also hope to be seen as a creator of new technologies and business opportunities, as well as a standard-bearer of Chinese culture. You can see that, within the past six years, our rescue personnel have been active providing aid to mainland China, Haiti, Japan, and the Philippines when these areas suffered natural disasters. We have also signed the Taiwan-Japan Fisheries Agreement, ending a conflict that had plagued the two sides for over 40 years. Also last year, our government engaged the Philippines in negotiations over the shooting death of one of our fishermen by members of the Philippine Coast Guard. We received an official apology and compensation, and the perpetrators are to be prosecuted, and we signed an agreement on law enforcement. This thus ended the crisis. Using peaceful means to end international disputes shows the international community that Taiwan is an asset, not a liability. We are, on the one hand, a peace builder, and on the other, a provider of aid to many nations in need.
Whether it’s the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, or the South China Sea, the trend is for greater peace and stability. We are looking for the Republic of China to continue to play this kind of role. In this way, should conflict occur across the Taiwan Strait, the Republic of China could count on international support.
The third line of defence is military power. We hope through foreign arms purchases, and improving our service members’ combat readiness, that we will create a sufficient deterrent. We do not seek war, but neither do we shrink from it. Our defensive strategy is to have a rock-solid defence force that is an effective deterrent.
Q15. In the context of the third line of defence, how problematic is the shift to an all-volunteer army proving? I understand that there are some problems with recruitment.
President Ma: Let me first clarify that we are not moving to an all-volunteer system. Ours will be largely a voluntary force, but not an all-volunteer force. We still have conscription. All males of enlistment age are obliged to spend four months in military training, following which they become part of the reserve. During wartime, they can also be called up to active service.
The Constitution states that the people have the duty to perform military service. Were we to do away with the four-month requirement, we would be in danger of violating the Constitution.
All nations that go by a volunteer system, especially those that had practiced conscription, experience a temporary dip in personnel numbers. With such a systemic change, it is natural that supporting measures will be insufficient. We have just made our change, and are tackling difficulties as they arise.
We have three main goals. First is to enhance the military’s combat readiness. Second is a more reasonable use of human capital. Last is reducing social costs.
As to enhancing combat readiness, let me explain by way of an example. Take a private. Under the old system, he would serve for a year. He completed his service just as he was getting a feel for things. Under the new system, volunteers serve for four years per enlistment. This means that mature soldiers will serve for a longer period. This will naturally increase combat readiness.
We also want to attract young people into the military, which requires improvements in three areas. The first is pay. A private under the old system would have been paid about NT$6,000 per month as basic salary. Under the volunteer system, that same soldier will receive NT$33,000, a better than fivefold increase. Second, is honour. We must, on many fronts, increase soldiers’ social status, that they get the respect they deserve. Third, is career path. During the four-year enlistment period, soldiers will be given all manner of vocational training. Our hope is that they end their time in the military with at least one professional certificate, that when they re-enter society, they will not have trouble finding a job.
Of course, we hope to retain such people, and we have seen a retention rate of nearly 60% following these recent developments. This is no small achievement since the changeover to the new system. And we have been resolving difficulties we have encountered one by one by implementing our strategy.
Second is the reasonable use of human capital. Not all males of enlistment age will now be required to serve, but rather only a small proportion. Others will be able to follow their own career interests. This is, of course, a more reasonable use of human capital.
Third is reducing the cost to society. When all the males of a certain age are serving in the military, this naturally places a cost on society. Many businesses will lack the manpower they need, which will limit our overall development. There is, therefore, a great social cost. Through the changes we have overseen, we will reduce this cost.
Two months ago, the Executive Yuan raised the salary for voluntary military personnel, which has had an amazing result. Some 60 years ago, our military personnel numbered over 600,000. Today, they stand at roughly 200,000, a number that may fall a little further. This size of military is sufficient to defend Taiwan given modern self-defence methods.
Q16. You talked about the peacemaking role of Taiwan. I wonder whether you see Xi Jinping as a peacemaker as well.
President Ma: I take from his remarks that he is. He often says that he seeks regional peace.
Q17. At the same time, we’ve seen a number of developments about which countries in this region have expressed great concern—the Philippines, Vietnam, and others—relating to, really the opposite of the situation you just described, in other words, what they see as attempts to change the status quo. How worried are you about that?
President Ma: Conflict between Japan and mainland China is of course worrisome. This is why, two years ago this August, I put forth the East China Sea Peace Initiative, in the hope that both sides would exercise self-restraint, prevent the escalation of tensions, and use peaceful dialogue to resolve conflict.
The Republic of China is a party to the dispute over the Diaoyutai Islands. We were the first to call for peace. As a consequence, we have signed a fisheries agreement with Japan. Even though we have not resolved the sovereignty dispute, we have resolved that concerning fisheries. So we have reduced the scope of the problem.
In other words, sovereignty cannot be divided, but resources can be shared. In Europe, in the UK, the way the dispute over North Sea oil deposits was resolved is worth looking at. Parties concerned did not quarrel over the size of their oceanic territories, but concentrated on co-operating to develop the oil resources. This is why Brent crude is an internationally recognised brand today.
As a party to the dispute, we may not be able to make the dispute between Japan and the mainland disappear immediately, but we can at least prevent it from growing. We can be a leader in using peaceful means to resolve the dispute, or to ameliorate it. We hope all parties will shelve their sovereignty claims and peacefully negotiate a way to jointly develop resources in the area.
Q18. If you look at the four economies that we used to club together as the original Asian Tigers—Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong—they are all having to reinvent themselves. Do you think that those four economies can still learn from each other? Does Taiwan have any other economic models in mind that it wants to emulate?
President Ma: I believe that the Four Asian Tigers can still learn from each other, even though their specific situations may be slightly different. For example, our situation is similar to that of the Republic of Korea, and rather different from those of Singapore and Hong Kong, because the latter are basically cities. Nonetheless, in terms of their strategies for economic development, they can still serve as a valuable reference.
Looking at the economic performance of these four countries and regions over the past six years, our economic growth rate has been 2.91%, second to Singapore. This is based on nominal GDP. If we look at GDP in terms of purchasing power parity, we have had the highest growth rate.
We also have had the lowest CPI among the Four Asian Tigers. Our unemployment rate has been relatively high, but our misery index—calculated by adding the inflation rate to the unemployment rate—was the second-lowest amongst the four.
Our problem is that we have made insufficient progress in terms of liberalisation, and the pace of our industrial restructuring has been too slow. With regard to regional economic integration, we have to make up considerable ground to be able to compete with Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Republic of Korea.
Q19. Domestic politics. It hasn’t looked good for your own popularity and you face a difficult period ahead with elections at the end of this year and 2016. What’s gone wrong?
President Ma: Electricity and gas price issues that emerged two years ago have caused discontent among our citizens. However, we are gradually overcoming these problems. People have also been dissatisfied with other issues, such as the capital-gains tax and US beef imports. But we have resolved these step by step.
We will continue to work hard to improve these situations, and we are confident that we will be able to do so.
----
Banyan
On the antlers of a dilemma
The ambitions of Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwan’s president, collide with popular suspicion of China
Mar 29th 2014 | From the print edition
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21599812-ambitions-ma-ying-jeou-taiwans-president-collide-popular-suspicion-china
THE fresh-faced good looks have been lined and drawn by the cares of office. His immaculate English is forsaken for the dignity of immaculate Mandarin. Patient replies to questions come wearily, as if said many times before. Yet, six years into his presidency, Ma Ying-jeou’s hair remains as lush and jet-black as any Chinese Politburo member’s. And, speaking in the presidential palace in Taipei, he remains as unwilling as any leader in Beijing to admit to any fundamental flaws in strategy.
Perhaps Mr Ma draws inspiration from his portrait of Sun Yat-sen, founder of his ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), and, in 1912, of the Republic of China to which Taiwan’s government still owes its name. Sun is revered as a nationalist hero not just by the KMT but, across the Taiwan Strait, by the Chinese Communist Party too. Mr Ma may also hope to be feted on both sides of the strait—in his case as a leader responsible for a historic rapprochement. For now, however, reconciliation between Taiwan and China remains distant. And Mr Ma, once the KMT’s most popular politician, is taunted by opponents as the “9% president”, a reference to his approval ratings in opinion polls last autumn.
Improving relations with China has been the central theme of his administration, after the tensions of eight years of rule by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which leans towards declaring formal independence from the mainland. Mr Ma can boast of 21 agreements signed with China. He reels off the numbers of two fast-integrating economies: a tenfold increase in six years in mainland tourists to Taiwan, to 2.85m in 2013; cross-strait flights from none at all to 118 every day; two-way trade, including with Hong Kong, up to $160 billion a year.
China’s strategy to reabsorb Taiwan is plain. As the island’s economy becomes more intertwined with that of the vast mainland, China thinks, resistance to unification will wane. Then Taiwan becomes an “autonomous” part of China—like Hong Kong, though allowed its own army. Taiwan will return to the motherland without resort to the missiles and increasingly powerful armed forces ranged against it. But as Mr Ma sees it, cross-strait “rapprochement” is a first line of defence against Chinese aggression, since “a unilateral move by the mainland to change the status quo by non-peaceful means would come at a dear price”. Politics in Taiwan is framed as a debate about independence or unification but is really about preserving the status quo.
The next step in rapprochement with China would be a meeting between political leaders. In February in Nanjing, once the capital of a KMT government of all China, ministers from China and Taiwan held their first formal meeting since 1949. Mr Ma hoped to meet China’s president, Xi Jinping, in Beijing this November, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summit. To accommodate Hong Kong and Taiwan, APEC’s members are not “countries” but “economies”. So Mr Xi and Mr Ma could meet as “economic leaders”, sidestepping the tricky protocol that usually dogs relations, with China viewing Taiwan as a mere province. The Chinese demurred. But Mr Ma thinks a meeting somewhere is “not outside the realm of possibility”.
This backdrop explains why a protest movement against a services-trade agreement with the mainland is more than a little local difficulty for Mr Ma. Students occupying parliament have resorted to undemocratic means, and many of the arguments they and the DPP make about the trade agreement are specious. But they have tapped a vein of popular mistrust of Mr Ma and of economic integration with the mainland. A split persists between native Taiwanese, on the island for generations, and mainlanders, like Mr Ma, whose families came over as the KMT lost the civil war in the 1940s. Protesters portray Mr Ma as either a mainland stooge or as clueless and out of touch. In the occupied parliament, student caricatures give him antlers, a reference to a slip he once made when he appeared to suggest that the deer-antlers used in Chinese medicine were in fact hair from the animal’s ears.
Mr Ma says public opinion supports a “Ma-Xi” summit. Joseph Wu of the DPP, however, claims such a meeting would actually damage the KMT in the next presidential election, due in 2016; rather, he says, Mr Ma is trying to leave a personal legacy. The DPP’s lead in the polls alarms not just the Chinese government but also America, which could do without another flare-up in a dangerous region. The stronger China grows, the more Taiwan’s security depends on commitments from America. It switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1979, but Congress then passed a law obliging it to help Taiwan defend itself.
All political lives end…
Mr Ma says relations with America are better than they have ever been at least since 1979 and perhaps before. Others are doubtful. In all the talk of America’s “pivot” to Asia, its promises to Taiwan are rarely mentioned. Many in Taiwan paid attention when John Mearsheimer, an American academic, suggested in the National Interest, a policy journal, that there is “a reasonable chance American policymakers will eventually conclude that it makes good strategic sense to abandon Taiwan and to allow China to coerce it into accepting unification.” For some, abandonment is a fact of life and unification a matter of time. “No one is on our side strategically, diplomatically, politically; we have to count on China’s goodwill,” an academic in Taipei argues.
Mr Ma has tried to steer what seems a sensible middle course between such defeatism and the adventurism of those in the DPP who would like to confront and challenge China. But he sounds weary with the effort, and Taiwan’s people seem weary of him. Their pragmatism and the DPP’s internecine strife may yet see them elect another KMT president in 2016. But if Mr Ma hoped to leave office with cross-strait relations stabilised, and with his own role as an historic peacemaker recognised on both sides and around the world, he seems likely to be disappointed.
Economist.com/blogs/banyan
沒有留言:
張貼留言
* 所有回應必經本人檢閱後發佈 *